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DIGGING INTO THE FOUNDATIONS
OF EVIDENCE LAW
David H. Kaye*
The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law. By Michael
J. Saks and Barbara A. Spellman. New York and London: New York
University Press. 2016. Pp. xiv, 241. Cloth, $89; paper, $38.
Introduction
Professors Michael Saks1 and Barbara Spellman2 have produced a gem of
a book. A concise, cogent, and thoughtful introduction to the major rules of
evidence, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law glitters in the light
of ideas from social and cognitive psychology. PFEL, as I will abbreviate it, is
an eminently accessible3 book that evidence professors should assign to their
students; that psychologists seeking research questions about evidence law
should consult;4 that litigators seeking to sharpen their persuasive powers
should peruse; and that judges engaged in screening improperly prejudicial
evidence from jurors should examine. In Saks and Spellman’s words, the
book
explores a number of important practices from evidence law about which
psychology does, or could, have a lot to say to illuminate the underlying
assumptions, and evaluates whether those assumptions are consistent with
the psychological research or whether the law’s goals for evidence doctrine
could be achieved more successfully with a modified rule or a different rule
or no rule at all. (p. 3)
This Review has three goals. Part I surveys PFEL’s scope and provides
examples of several of its conclusions. Part II focuses on one psychological
* Associate Dean for Research, Distinguished Professor of Law, and Weiss Family
Scholar, Penn State Law; Regents Professor Emeritus, Arizona State University Sandra Day
O’Connor College of Law. Jay Koehler and Michael Saks provided comments on a draft of this
essay.
1. Regents’ Professor of Law and Psychology and Faculty Fellow, Center for Law, Sci-
ence, and Innovation Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law.
2. Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
3. It stands as a counterexample to the generalization that, in psychology, “even out-
standing authorities have been known to run in circles ‘describing things which everyone
knows in language which no one understands.’ ” Raymond B. Cattell, The Scientific
Analysis of Personality 18 (1965).
4. Cf. Michael J. Saks, Editorial, The Law Does Not Live by Eyewitness Testimony Alone,
10 Law & Hum. Behav. 279 (1986) (encouraging behavioral psychologists to expand their
research beyond eyewitness testimony and into other areas of evidence law).
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(or logical) model that the book presents for understanding two fundamen-
tal concepts in evidence: relevance and probative value. It digs into the foun-
dations of these concepts more deeply to expose a slightly different
conception of the probative value, or, more metaphorically, the weight of
evidence.
I. Exposing the Foundations
At a granular level, the sheer number of rules of evidence is vast,5 but
PFEL surveys the major federal rules with emphasis on probative value,
counterweights to relevant evidence, character evidence, competency of wit-
nesses, privileges, impeachment, hearsay, limited admissibility,6 and expert
and scientific evidence.7 Throughout these areas, PFEL maintains that psy-
chology can improve on rulemakers’ “assumptions, impressions, anecdotes,
and reasoning about human behavior” in two ways (p. 16)—by conducting
controlled experiments (simulations with mock jurors and “similar studies
to take place in the setting of actual trials”)8 and by “borrow[ing] from the
findings of more basic empirical research, or from theoretical knowledge
5. See Steuart Henderson Britt, The Rules of Evidence—An Empirical Study in Psychology
and Law, 25 Cornell L.Q. 556, 558 (1940) (“From the entire body of principles and defini-
tions known as the ‘rules of evidence,’ 154 rules were selected for intensive statistical study.
These 154 rules were . . . . selected by careful analysis from the 3,150 rules in Wigmore’s Code
of Evidence.”). PFEL reproduces most of the Federal Rules of Evidence to generate 30 pages (9
percent) of its text. Pp. 247–77.
6. “Limited admissibility” refers to the doctrine that evidence may be admissible for
one purpose but not for another. This situation arises frequently. Obvious examples are other-
crimes evidence (when introduced for so-called “non-propensity” purposes); impeachment
evidence (a prior inconsistent statement that is inadmissible hearsay if offered for its truth is
nevertheless admissible to impeach the witness making the current statement as an indication
that the witness says contradictory things and therefore should not be believed about any-
thing); substantively inadmissible evidence introduced solely to show the basis for an expert’s
opinion; and evidence of subsequent remedial measures, compromise offers and negotiations,
offers to pay medical and similar expenses, and liability insurance. PFEL ably surveys the
efficacy of methods to help jurors reason as the law would like them to under the heading of
“Instructions to Disregard and to Limit.” P. 85. Strangely, it refers to only the last set of rules
as “the categorical exclusion rules.” P. 73. A rule such as Rule 404(a) on character evidence is
no less a “categorical exclusion rule” that reflects an across-the-board balancing of probative
value and prejudice. Likewise for the “Frye rule,” which categorically excludes testimony about
scientific test results when the test lacks general acceptance in the relevant scientific commu-
nity. What makes PFEL’s subset of categorical rules distinctive is that they are not simply a
crystallization of “the balancing of probativeness and prejudice that judges are called upon to
perform during trials under Rule 403.” P. 72. As Saks and Spellman emphasize, those exclu-
sionary rules seek to promote what other writers have called “extrinsic policies.” David P.
Leonard, The New Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence: Selected Rules of Limited Ad-
missibility (rev. ed. 2002).
7. See pp. 322–23.
8. See pp. 16–17. The authors allude to “many different research designs,” p. 17, and
refer to some observational studies (such as a before-and-after study of a change in a rule and
a crude comparison between civil and criminal cases), pp. 224–25, but there is less discussion
of this mode of causal inference. For a more detailed but elementary exposition of the relative
strengths and weaknesses of different methods, and for more examples of their use in studies
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about human perception, memory, and information processing” (p. 17). In
particular, PFEL brings to bear findings about mental contamination (“how
prior knowledge can bias future judgments in an unwanted manner”),9 dual
systems reasoning (System 1’s fast and frugal heuristics10 versus System 2’s
“slower, conscious, and reflective” processing) (p. 20), information integra-
tion theory (“how people combine bits of information into a final judg-
ment”) (p. 43), motivated reasoning (p. 208), contextual bias (p. 26),
attribution theory (p. 79), “weapons of influence” (pp. 40–41), and “diffu-
sion of responsibility” (p. 216). It also includes specific studies on such top-
ics as the impact of gruesome pictures (pp. 64–65), observer or expectancy
effects in forensic science,11 lie detection (pp. 122–28), decision aids for ex-
pert evidence (pp. 226–27), and framing effects in the presentation of statis-
tical evidence (pp. 221–22).
On the basis of such theory and findings, Saks and Spellman give the
modern trial process high marks in some respects. As they see it, “[t]he rules
came into being to rein in the inevitable excesses of lawyers in an adversarial
system” (p. 11). That is, Saks and Spellman embrace the theory of several
legal historians that “limits had to be placed on what . . . lawyers would be
permitted to do” (p. 11) in an adversarial system as opposed to an inquisito-
rial one, in which these one-sided lawyers played a more ancillary role. But
they believe that the adversarial system alone is not the full explanation. The
presence of impressionable jurors also matters. “[P]ut the adversary process
together with juries, and evidence rules become a necessary device for re-
straining lawyers, thereby protecting jurors from being deceived or misled”
(p. 11). They then find that, as a whole, the rules of evidence perform this
restraining function very well:
[T]he rules that govern the trial have the effect of blocking or dampening
the use of influence techniques that do not contribute to the (relatively)
rational resolution of the disputed issues. In their effort to make trials
more information-based and more rational, the rulemakers have done
quite well by limiting the possibilities for using the most powerful tools of
persuasion and influence. (p. 41)
of the legal system, see generally Hans Zeisel & David Kaye, Prove It with Figures: Em-
pirical Methods in Law and Litigation (1997).
9. P. 18. Saks and Spellman note that the phrase is not common. P. 18.
10. P. 20 (“System I responds to information quickly, unconsciously, and by using
heuristics.”). The particular phrase “fast and frugal” comes from the writing of Gerd Giger-
enzer and his colleagues. E.g., Gerd Gigerenzer et al., How Good Are Fast and Frugal Heuristics?,
in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 559, 559 (Thomas
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
11. Pp. 207–11 (“Once we desire to reach or hold onto a conclusion, that motivation
activates a number of cognitive processes to push our reasoning in the direction of the desired
conclusion. Our mind discounts contrary evidence and overweights confirmatory informa-
tion, stretches or shrinks logical connections, widens or narrows categories, etc., all to help us
reach the conclusion we want to be able to reach. The expert does not intentionally mislead.”).
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Those tools, in the nomenclature of social psychologist Robert Cialdini, are
the “six weapons”—reciprocation,12 commitment and consistency,13 author-
ity,14 social proof,15 scarcity,16 and liking17—and they are not fully functional
for lawyers seeking to persuade jurors and judges.
PFEL is similarly laudatory in its assessments of the rules that channel
and limit evidence of a person’s character (or traits of character). In devel-
oping this doctrine (which continues to befuddle courts that must apply it),
“rulemakers had latched onto some notions that are even more sound than
they ever realized” (p. 29). “[T]he law’s doubts about the usefulness of the
concepts of character and personality are on the correct track psychologi-
cally. As to habit, from the perspective of psychological research and theory,
the law is even more on target” (pp. 166–67).
PFEL also has much to say about jurors’ abilities and performance on
various tasks. The institution of multi-member juries fares well. “Twelve (or
8 or 6) heads are better than one” for many reasons, “including the averag-
ing of information, the aggregation of information, the suppression of indi-
vidual jurors’ biases, and the necessity of engaging in System 2 deliberative
reasoning” (p. 46). And “a substantial body of empirical research has found
that, for the great majority of cases, the characteristics of the jurors make
12. “[P]eople more readily comply with requests (for favors, information, contributions,
concessions, etc.) from those who have previously provided something to them. Attorneys
cannot do favors for or give gifts to jurors, or treat them to lunch.” P. 40.
13. [P]eople more readily change their opinion in a particular direction if they see it as
consistent with an existing recent commitment. The challenge, therefore, is first to get
people to make a small commitment in the desired direction; they will then be more
willing to take the larger step that you want them to take. Attorneys certainly cannot
obtain from jurors public behavioral commitments that are favorable to one side.
P. 40.
14. [P]eople are more willing to follow the directions or recommendations of a com-
municator whom they perceive as having relevant authority or expertise. Jurors might
believe that attorneys are authorities—but there are attorneys on both sides. Issues of
following authority are more likely to come up with judges . . . or experts . . . .
P. 40.
15. [P]eople are more willing to take a requested or suggested course of action if they
see others, especially others similar to themselves, doing so. . . . [But] jurors typically are
instructed to avoid learning what anyone else thinks about the case they are in the pro-
cess of deciding. Lawyers themselves might be torn over whether to appear to jurors as
authorities or as people “just like them.”
Pp. 40–41.
16. [P]eople find objects, activities, and information more attractive to the extent that
those things are seen as scarce or declining in availability. A salesman might say, “There
are only two of this product left” or “The sale lasts only until tomorrow.” How to apply
this tactic in a trial is not apparent.
P. 41.
17. [P]eople are more inclined to comply with the wishes of those they know and like
than to strangers or people they know but dislike. Lawyers can’t directly employ this
weapon because jurors who are friends of one (or more) of the lawyers will be dismissed
from the jury panel. But they might try in subtle ways to get jurors to like them.
P. 41.
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only a modest difference to the verdict, whereas the evidence and arguments
presented at trial have the greatest impact.”18
Of course, jurors (and judges) have many limitations. Nobody (or at
least no cross section of people) is a very good lie detector.
Despite decades of research effort to maximize the accuracy of deception
judgments, detection rates rarely budge. Professionals’ judgments, interac-
tants’ judgments, judgments of high-stakes lies, judgments of unsanctioned
lies, judgments made by long-term acquaintances—all reveal detection
rates within a few points of 50%. [Are we ready to] accept the conclusion
implied by the first 384 research samples—that to people who must judge
deception in real time with no special aids, many lies are undetectable[?]19
Moreover, “[w]hen it comes to direct assertions of confidence (e.g., ‘I’m
sure’) . . . the research shows that witness accuracy and witness confidence
are generally not highly correlated. Jurors, however, place great stock in such
assertions of confidence” (p. 133). Because “the actual value of the evidence
and how jurors perceive the value of the evidence are far apart[, this] is[ ] an
area begging for a rule” (p. 133).
In other areas, however, the authors find the research insufficient to
refine or modify the folk psychology of jurists and legislators. For example,
[m]any, but not all, of the studies find that the mock jurors give less weight
to the same testimony when presented as hearsay than when presented by
the witness with personal knowledge. . . . The studies vary on the hearsay
exception that the information falls under, the instructions of the judge to
the mock jurors, whether there was deliberation by the mock jurors,
whether an expert testified on the problems of hearsay evidence, etc. With
so many variables and so few studies, the research is not rich or systematic
enough to draw conclusions about specific hearsay exceptions. . . .
. . . .
. . . Psychology research could do a lot more . . . . (pp. 188, 201)
Moving outside the realm of assumptions and studies on jury performance,
Saks and Spellman are also guarded in their conclusions. Thus, they write
that
[t]he policy rationale [for Rule 407 on the admissibility of proof of subse-
quent remedial measures] is that the law wants to encourage defendants to
make repairs . . . [but critics maintain that] citizens are unlikely to be aware
18. P. 36. The authors wisely caution, however, that “there are some important excep-
tions . . . . Individual factors are most likely to matter if cases are close, if they involve non-
common knowledge, or if personal attributes are an issue.” P. 38. The first exception is related
to the “liberation hypothesis” propounded in Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The Amer-
ican Jury (1966), and studied extensively since then. E.g., Dennis J. Devine et al., Strength of
Evidence, Extraevidentiary Influence, and the Liberation Hypothesis: Data from the Field, 33 Law
& Hum. Behav. 136 (2009); Amy Farrell & Daniel Givelber, Liberation Reconsidered: Under-
standing Why Judges and Juries Disagree about Guilt, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1549
(2010).
19. P. 125 (first alteration in original) (quoting Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo,
Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev. 214, 231 (2006)).
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of Rule 407, and if they are not aware of it, it is unlikely to affect their
behavior. (p. 77)
Yet the authors “are aware of no empirical research testing whether the
rulemakers or the critics have the stronger behavioral argument” (p. 78).
Indeed, PFEL suggests that direct psychological or sociological studies are
unlikely to provide an answer to some of the law’s empirical questions. For
example, they note that
[p]sychologists have not done much research on privileges, most likely be-
cause they are not amenable to experimental research . . . . [T]here is some
survey research . . . but it is doubtful that survey methodology could pro-
vide good reliable answers to most of the important questions about privi-
leges. (pp. 140–41)
I could continue describing the authors’ many assessments and insights,
but I would not want to steal all the punchlines. Suffice it to say that, in
PFEL, two of the world’s leading scholars and teachers of law and psychol-
ogy20 distill a huge body of information and present their own opinions
across the wide landscape of trial rules, procedures, and players.21
II. Excavating One Cornerstone
The panoramic view of PFEL blurs some details, and a number of its
comments leave subtleties unstated.22 This Part examines PFEL’s exposition
of two foundational concepts in evidence: relevance and probative value. My
objective is to dig more deeply into this corner of the law by unveiling alter-
natives to the psychological (or logical) models mentioned in PFEL.23
20. Inasmuch as PFEL concerns effects of mental contamination (and full disclosure is
always valuable), I should note that Professor Saks and I worked together for years as col-
leagues at Arizona State University and as co-authors of the treatise David L. Faigman, David
H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks & Joseph Sanders, Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and
Science of Expert Testimony (2002). I know Barbara Spellman only through (some of) her
writing and accolades, such as her selection as a fellow of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science on the basis of her “ ‘distinguished contributions to the field of cogni-
tive psychology’ for her innovative research on reasoning and memory, and ‘for academic
service to psychological journals and societies.’ ” Fariss Samarrai, U. Va.’s Barbara A. Spellman,
Psychology and Law Professor, Named AAAS Fellow, UVA Today (Jan. 11, 2011), https://
news.virginia.edu/content/uvas-barbara-spellman-psychology-and-law-professor-named-aaas-
fellow [https://perma.cc/J6WP-X36L].
21. Emphasis could be placed on the word “distill.” PFEL is not the place to find com-
plete bibliographies, formal meta-analyses, and filigreed literature reviews.
22. For more details on many of the topics surveyed in PFEL, see Roger C. Park &
Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C.
L. Rev. 949 (2006).
23. PFEL also points to a “holistic-story model” for integrating information, pp. 44–46,
61, but it does not present any description of degrees of probative value within a coherence-
based theory. In my view, the fact that jurors and judges seek to fit information into a psycho-
logically coherent framework does not preclude using the measures of probative value
presented in this Part and in PFEL, pp. 59–61, to make judgments about relevance and proba-
tive value, but I will not defend this view here. For more elaborate discussion of coherence-
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Saks and Spellman rightly observe:
Often, when rulemakers adopt a general rule of evidence, they do so by
trying to compare the optimal or ideal or proper inferences to be drawn
from a class of evidence to how they imagine average jurors will interpret
the evidence.
. . . .
. . . [R]ulemakers are acting not only as amateur psychologists, but
also as amateur logicians, statisticians, and scientists of various kinds. (pp.
7–8; footnotes omitted)
This is clearly true of the interlocking concepts of relevance, probative value,
and the “counterweights”24 that can block the admission of relevant evi-
dence. In particular, psychologists, economists, and other social scientists
interested in mathematical models for human inference and decisionmaking
have long adapted Bayes’s rule of “inverse probability”25—described be-
low—to serve as a model for updating a person’s assessments of probabili-
ties. Saks and Spellman follow suit, writing that
[t]he most prominent theory bearing on ideal inferences from evidence is
Bayes’ Theorem. . . . [T]he theorem deals with the situation in which deci-
sion makers update, perhaps repeatedly, their initial estimation of the
probability that a certain conclusion is true. That should sound something
like the task of a factfinder in a trial, presented with unfolding evidence. At
any given point in the trial, a decision maker has an estimation of the
[probability] that a certain conclusion, such as the guilt of the defendant, is
true (called the prior probability); the decision maker is provided with ad-
ditional evidence (reflected in the theorem as a likelihood ratio), which en-
ables a revision of that estimation, increasing or decreasing the estimate of
the probability of guilt (called the posterior probability). Bayes’ Theorem
has been used to model the concept of relevance in Rule 401—which, in
part, states that a fact is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence”— and to argue for
solutions to evidentiary problems facing trial factfinders.26
based reasoning, see Amalia Amaya, The Tapestry of Reason: An Inquiry into the Na-
ture of Coherence and Its Role in Legal Argument (2015). See also Jennifer L. Mnookin,
Atomism, Holism, and the Judicial Assessment of Evidence, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1524, 1543 (2013)
(“[T]he Federal Rules take a strikingly atomistic approach to determining whether an item is
relevant under Rule 401 and hence presumptively admissible under Rule 402”).
24. See generally 1 McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 994–1012 (Kenneth S. Broun et
al. eds., 7th ed. 2013).
25. E.g., Clyde H. Coombs et al., Mathematical Psychology 145–47 (1970); Ray-
mond S. Nickerson, Cognition and Chance: The Psychology of Probabilistic Reason-
ing 109–42 (2004). On the terminology and history of inverse probability, see Andrew I.
Dale, A History of Inverse Probability (2d ed. 1999). As Nickerson and Dale indicate,
Laplace should share substantial credit for the version of the rule that today bears Bayes’s
name.
26. P. 44. They add that “[h]umans are not, however, intuitive Bayesians, and the extent
to which conclusions that emerge from Bayesian models should be explicitly presented to
juries is controversial.” P. 44. This is a reference to the debate initiated by the proposal in
Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1970), to use Bayes’s rule to explain to jurors how the rarity of features
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The Bayesian account of relevance that PFEL cites is Professor Richard
Lempert’s27 lucid exposition of the “likelihood ratio” and the “regret matrix”
as heuristic models28 for defining “relevant” evidence in Rule 401 and ex-
plaining the risks of “misleading the jury” and “prejudice” that Rule 403
requires judges to balance against “probative value.” PFEL does not delve
deeply into either of these models. It does not deploy Lempert’s decision-
making model (or well-known variations of it) to show how evidence could
be unfairly prejudicial. It does not explicitly recognize that Bayesian infer-
ence is hardly the sole basis for the likelihood-ratio definition of relevance
(and perhaps not even the original one).29 And it endorses a debatable defi-
nition of probative value without comparing it to the more mainstream al-
ternative for quantification.30 To be sure, it is unfair to ask too much of short
discussions designed to illustrate broader ideas, but a brief elaboration on
used to make an identification from trace evidence should affect their judgment of the
probability that the defendant is the source of the trace. For discussion of cases in which
experts have presented such numbers, see David H. Kaye et al., The New Wigmore: A
Treatise on Evidence § 14.3 (2d ed. 2011).
27. Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1021 (1977).
28. In speaking of Bayes’s rule (or any other part of mathematics) as a “model,” it helps
to distinguish between descriptive, normative, and heuristic applications. First, whether
Bayes’s rule is an accurate description of the probability judgments of most people (perhaps in
some circumstances but not in others) is an empirical question. For a few opinions on how
well Bayesian learning models fit the results of some studies of human cognition under differ-
ent conditions, see Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians After
All? Rethinking Some Conclusions from the Literature on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 58 Cog-
nition 1 (1996); Joshua B. Tenenbaum et al., Theory-Based Bayesian Models of Inductive
Learning and Reasoning, 10 Trends Cognitive Sci. 309 (2006); cf. Paul Cisek, The Currency of
Guessing, 447 Nature 1061 (2007) (presenting research suggesting that monkeys use likeli-
hood ratios in classifying objects); Hannes Rakoczy et al., Apes Are Intuitive Statisticians, 131
Cognition 60 (2014).
Second, whether people should conform their judgments to those of the model in certain
circumstances is a normative matter. If the law of evidence “wants” jurors to reach results that
accord with those prescribed by the model, then we might be able to construct rules that
somehow lead jurors to those outcomes (by prompting them to use System 2 reasoning or by
affecting inputs for System 1 reasoning).
Finally, if some of the law is structured to bring juror performance more in line with the
prescriptions of the models, these models can give law students, lawyers, and judges a more
precise understanding of those features of the legal doctrine. In particular, “[a]s a language,
mathematics can help clarify those legal rules that involve weighing evidence in an essentially
probabilistic fashion,” Lempert, supra note 27, at 1021–22, and it can explicate the meaning of
ambiguous terms. E.g., David Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitor, 77 Mich. L.
Rev. 1456–57 (1979).
29. See John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability 55 (1921) (defining “irrel-
evant” evidence as that which does not change a conditional probability); David H. Kaye,
Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and a Pair of Shoes, 53 Jurimetrics J. 1, 5–8 (2012) (arguing that
the likelihood-ratio definition of probative value does not require a commitment to Bayesian
inference at all).
30. There are, of course, alternatives to quantification as well as alternative ideas for
quantification. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Traditional Probability, Relative Plausibil-
ity, or Belief Function?, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 353, 353 (2015) (arguing that Dempster-
Shafer “belief functions nicely clarify the workings of burdens of persuasion and production”);
Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 Law & Phil.
April 2017] Digging into the Foundations of Evidence Law 923
the last two points might further cement this part of the “foundations of
evidence law.” To do so, the remainder of this Review answers three ques-
tions: What is a likelihood ratio? What is Bayes’s rule? And how are they
related to one another and to the legal concepts of relevance and probative
value? I describe a way to think about the likelihood ratio that does not
depend on Bayes’s rule, and I defend the use of the likelihood ratio as a
measure of probative value instead of the particular change-in-probability
quantity that PFEL presents.
A. Relevance Defined
1. The Likelihood Ratio as the Foundation
The “likelihood ratio” is a concept that pervades statistics.31 As Lempert
argued, it can be used to define whether an item of evidence is relevant.32 For
example, in the 1990s researchers developed a prostate cancer test based on
the level of prostate-specific antigen (“PSA”).33 The test, they said, was far
from definitive but still had diagnostic value.34 Should anyone have believed
them? A straightforward method for validation is to run the test on subjects
known to have the disease and on other subjects known to be disease-free.
The PSA test was shown to give a positive result (to indicate that the cancer
was present) about 70% of the time when the cancer was, in fact, present,
and about 10% of the time when the cancer was not actually present.35 Thus,
the test has diagnostic value. The doctor and patient can understand that
positive results arise more often among patients with the disease than
among those without it.36
But why should we say that the greater probability of the evidence (a
positive test result) among cancer patients than among cancer-free patients
makes the test diagnostic of prostate cancer? There are three answers. One is
that if we use it to sort patients into the two categories, we will (in the long
223, 223–25 (2008) (favoring “inference to the best explanation”); Alex Stein, Inefficient Evi-
dence, 66 Ala. L. Rev. 423, 424–25 (2015) (invoking the “signal-to-noise ratio”).
31. Vic Barnett, Comparative Statistical Inference 306 (3d ed. 1999) (“The princi-
ples of maximum likelihood and of likelihood ratio tests occupy a central place in statistical
methodology.”); see, e.g., id. at 178–80 (describing likelihood ratio tests in frequentist hypoth-
esis testing); N. Reid, Likelihood, in Statistics in the 21st Century 419 (Adrian E. Raftery et
al. eds., 2002).
32. Lempert, supra note 27, at 1025–27.
33. See Nat’l Cancer Inst., Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA) Test, July 24, 2012, http://
www.cancer.gov/types/prostate/psa-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/PR9Z-M4T7].
34. Id.
35. Carvell T. Nguyen & Michael W. Kattan, Prediction Models in Prostate Cancer Diag-
nosis, in Prostate Cancer Diagnosis: PSA, Biopsy and Beyond 85, 86 (J. Stephen Jones ed.,
2013). In the nomenclature of clinical medicine, the PSA test is 70 percent sensitive and 90
percent specific.
36. Likewise, negative results occur more often among patients without the disease than
among those with it.
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run) do a better job than if we use some totally bogus procedure (such as
flipping a coin). This is a “frequentist” interpretation of diagnostic value.
A second justification takes the notion of “support” for a hypothesis as
fundamental.37 Results that are more probable under a hypothesis H1 about
the true state of affairs are stronger evidence for H1 than for any alternative
(H2) under which they are less probable. If the evidence were to occur with
equal probability under both states, however, the evidence would lend equal
support to both possibilities. In this example, such evidence would provide
no basis for distinguishing between cancer-free and cancer-afflicted patients.
It would have no diagnostic value,38 and the test should be kept off the mar-
ket. The coin-flipping test is like this. A head is no more or less probable
when the cancer is present than when it is absent.
A difference between the “frequentist,” long-run justification and the
“likelihoodist,” support-based understanding is that the latter applies even
when we do not perform or imagine a long series of tests. If it really is more
probable to observe the data under one state of affairs than another, it
would seem perverse to conclude that the data somehow support the latter
over the former. The data are “more consistent” with the state of affairs that
makes their appearance on a single occasion more probable (even without
the possibility of replication).
The same thing is true of circumstantial evidence in law. Circumstantial
evidence E that is just as probable when one party’s account is true as it is
when that account is false has no value as proof that the account is true or
false. It supports both states of nature equally and is logically irrelevant. To
condense these observations into a formula, we can write:
E is irrelevant (to choosing between H1 and H2) if P(E⏐H1) = P(E⏐H2),
where P(E⏐H1) and P(E⏐H2) are the probabilities of the evidence condi-
tional on (“given the truth of,” or just “given”) the hypotheses. The condi-
tional probabilities (or quantities that are directly proportional to them)
have a special name: likelihoods. So a mathematically equivalent statement is
that
E is irrelevant if the likelihood ratio L = P(E⏐H1) / P(E⏐H2) = 1.
A fancier way to express it is that E is irrelevant if the logarithm of L is
0. Such evidence E has zero “weight” when placed on a metaphorical balance
scale that aggregates the weight of the evidence in favor of one hypothesis or
37. A “support function” can be required to have several appealing, formal properties,
such as transitivity and additivity. E.g., A.W.F. Edwards, Likelihood 28–32 (Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press, expanded ed. 1992) (1972). It also can be derived, in simple cases, from other,
arguably more fundamental, principles. E.g., Barnett, supra note 31, at 310–11.
38. See Steven McGee, Simplifying Likelihood Ratios, 17 J. Gen. Internal Med. 647, 647
(2002) (“Findings whose [likelihood ratios] equal 1 lack diagnostic value.”).
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the other.39 In this case, the likelihood ratio for a positive test result is 70% ÷
10% = 7, which is greater than 1. Thus, the test is relevant evidence in decid-
ing whether the patient has cancer.
2. Bayes’s Rule as the Foundation
Nothing that I have said so far involves Bayes’s rule.40 “Likelihood” and
“support” are the primitive concepts. Lempert argued for a likelihood ratio
of 1 as the defining characteristic of relevance by relying on a third justifica-
tion—the Bayesian model of learning.41 How does this work? Think of
probability as a pile of poker chips. Being 100% certain that a particular
hypothesis about the world is correct means that all of the chips sit on top of
that hypothesis. Twenty-five percent certainty means that 25% of the chips
sit on the same hypothesis, and the remaining 75% are allocated to the other
hypotheses.42 To keep things as simple as possible, let’s assume there are only
two hypotheses that could be true.43 To be concrete, let’s say that H1 asserts
that the individual has cancer and that H2 asserts that he does not. Assume
that doctors know that men with this patient’s symptoms have a 25%
probability of having prostate cancer. We start with 25% of the chips on
hypothesis 1 (H1: cancer) and 75% on the alternative (H2: some other cause
of the symptoms). Learning that the PSA test is positive for cancer requires
us to take some of the chips from H2 and put them on H1. Bayes’s rule
dictates just how many chips we transfer. The exact amount generally de-
pends on two things: the percentage of chips that were on H1 (the prior
probability) and the likelihood ratio L in this simple situation. The top panel
of Figure 1 illustrates the reallocation of probability (visualized as the height
of piles of chips) in light of new evidence E (the elevated PSA level that
occurs 7 times as often when the cancer is present than when it is absent).
The bottom panel shows the reallocation when L = 1.
39. See generally I. J. Good, Weight of Evidence and the Bayesian Likelihood Ratio, in The
Use of Statistics in Forensic Science 85 (C.G.G. Aitken & D.A. Stoney eds., 1991); I. J.
Good, Weight of Evidence: A Brief Survey, in 2 Bayesian Statistics 249 (J.M. Bernardo et al.
eds., 1985) (providing background information regarding the use of Bayesian statistics in eval-
uating weight of evidence). Good’s conception of the weight of evidence, see infra note 58,
which is used here in spirit, if not in great detail, should not be confused with “Keynesian
weight” discussed recently in Dale A. Nance, The Burdens of Proof: Discriminatory
Power, Weight of Evidence, and Tenacity of Belief (2016).
40. Cf. D.H. Kaye, Quantifying Probative Value, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 761, 763–66 (1986) (dis-
cussing the likelihood ratio and log-L as a measure of the degree to which evidence has proba-
tive value).
41. Lempert, supra note 27, at 1025.
42. If the individual were to keep some of the chips in reserve, the analogy between the
fraction of them on a hypothesis and the kind of probability that pertains to random events
such as games of chance would break down.
43. These hypotheses might be quite specific (for example, either the defendant forged
the signature of his deceased brother on the suicide note (H1), or the brother wrote the signa-
ture (H2) in a case in which no one else could have written the note) or they might be a
conjunction of propositions (for example, the prosecution’s account of the alleged crime (H1)
and the only other account (H2) that the jury considers even vaguely plausible).
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Figure 1. Bayes’s Rule Applied to Two Mutually Exclusive,
Collectively Exhaustive Hypotheses with Prior Odds of
25:75(1:3) and Likelihood Ratios of 7 (Top
Panel) and 1 (bottom panel)
This picture follows from the very simple structure of Bayes’s rule in
this case:
Odds(H1) · L = Odds(H1⏐E).
The rule requires updating the “prior odds” (on the left-hand side) by mul-
tiplying by the Bayes factor (which also is the likelihood ratio L) to arrive at
the “posterior odds” (on the right-hand side). Each set of odds is just the
ratio of the percentage of chips given to each hypothesis before and then
after receiving the evidence. These odds are implicit in the relative heights of
the piles of chips. The initial pile of 25% of the chips on H1 corresponds to
the prior odds of 25:75 = 1:3. There is one chip on H1 to every three chips
on H2.
The crucial point is that multiplication by L = 1 never changes the prior
odds. Evidence that is equally probable under each hypothesis produces no
change in the allocation of the chips—no matter what the initial distribution.
Prior odds of 1:3 become posterior odds of 1:3. Prior odds of 10,000:1 be-
come posterior odds of 10,000:1. The evidence is never worth considering.
Again, we can get fancy and place the odds and the likelihood ratio on a
logarithmic scale. Then the posterior log odds are the prior log odds plus the
weight of the evidence (WOE = log-L):
New LO = Prior LO + WOE.44
44. A deeper motivation for using logarithms may lie in information theory, but, if so, it
is not important here. See Solomon Kullback, Information Theory and Statistics (1959).
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Evidence that has zero weight (L = 1, log-L = 0) leaves us where we
started. Evidence E that does not change the odds (and, hence, the corre-
sponding probability) is uninformative—it is irrelevant. Inversely, evidence
that does change the probability is relevant—as Rule 401 states in near-iden-
tical terms. This, in a nutshell, is the Bayesian explanation of the rule as it
applies to circumstantial evidence. It tracks the text of the rule better than
the likelihoodist, support-based analysis, but both lead to the conclusion
that relevance vel non turns on whether the likelihood ratio departs from 1.
B. Probative Value Quantified
I have expended some effort to give separate accounts of Rule 401 partly
to correct the widespread perception among legal scholars (and in forensic
science as well) that likelihood ratios are uniquely Bayesian. The effort is
also useful as preparation for investigating PFEL’s quantification of proba-
tive value. Attempts at quantification might seem purely theoretical, but they
have important practical implications. Like pregnancy, relevance is strictly
binary. Evidence either is or is not relevant to a material fact. In contrast,
probative value comes in an infinite number of gradations, and Rule 403
asks judges to balance it against a set of counterweights.45 But if several di-
vergent ways to quantify the value are equally plausible, advocates can pick
the one they want to argue that an item of evidence is or is not very proba-
tive.46 Moreover, expert witnesses can, and do, describe the implications and
probative value of their data in various ways. Forensic scientists and statisti-
cians still debate how best to express the numerical “weight of evidence”—
their term for “probative value”—for scientific test results.47 The simple like-
lihood ratio is the basic measure that dominates the forensic science litera-
ture on evaluative conclusions.48 However, most writers in this area construe
the likelihood ratio as the ratio of posterior odds to prior odds and base its
use on that purely Bayesian interpretation.49 Greater clarity would come
45. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee’s note.
46. See Gary L. Wells, Adversarial Forum: Further Comments on the Probative Value of
Evidence, 27 Law & Hum. Behav. 623 (2003).
47. See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech., Technical Colloquium on Quantifying the
Weight of Forensic Evidence: Online Proceedings, May 5–6, 2016, http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/
evidential_value_proceedings.cfm [http://perma.cc/X8XC-8NRX].
48. E.g., J.S. Buckleton et al., An Extended Likelihood Ratio Framework for Interpreting
Evidence, 46 Sci. & Just. 69, 70 (2006) (“The idea of assessing the weight of evidence using a
relative measure (known as the likelihood ratio) . . . dominates the literature as the method of
choice for interpreting forensic evidence across evidence types.”) (citations omitted); Cedric
Neumann et al., Presenting Quantitative and Qualitative Information on Forensic Science Evi-
dence in the Courtroom, 29 Chance 37, 37 (2016) (referring to “the abundant literature pub-
lished over the past 30 years advocating . . . [that] forensic scientists should report the relative
support that forensic evidence provides to each side of the legal argument using a Bayes factor
(also sometimes referred to as a likelihood ratio . . . )”); Anders Nordgaard et al., Scale of
Conclusions for the Value of Evidence, 11 Law, Probability & Risk 1, 8 (2012) (“The state-of-
art in forensic interpretation is to evaluate forensic evidence with the use of a likelihood
ratio.”).
49. E.g., Nordgaard et al., supra note 48, at 8.
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from using the related term “Bayes factor”50 when this is the motivation for
the ratio.51
How, then, do Saks and Spellman think probative value should be quan-
tified? The measure they describe (and apparently endorse) is neither the
likelihood ratio nor the Bayes factor. It is the arithmetic difference between
the prior and posterior probabilities—that is, P(H1⏐E) – P(H1). This quan-
tity is the marginal probability ÄP that results from E. They present and use
this ÄP rule as follows:
One way of quantifying probative value is by considering the probability of
the fact given the piece of evidence (the “conditional probability”) and
subtracting the probability of the fact when the evidence is unknown. Sup-
pose the fact we want to know is whether the driver-defendant was driving
the getaway car. Before the first witness’s testimony that the driver-defen-
dant owns that type of car, we have little reason to believe that he was the
driver. The witness’s testimony that he owns such a car makes us somewhat
more likely to believe he was the driver; that difference between our before
and after beliefs in his guilt is the probative value of that evidence. Now we
have some belief that he was the driver and next we learn from the second
witness that the two defendants are good friends. Our belief in his guilt
rises once again. Finally, we learn that the second witness might have rea-
son to lie, so we devalue the testimony of the second witness, and our belief
in the robber-defendant’s guilt decreases. Thus, relevant evidence can make
a fact more or less probable, and it is the size of that difference in the
probability of the fact with and without the evidence that represents its
probative value. (Pp. 60–61; footnote omitted)
Notice that “the size of that difference in the probability of the fact” is the
percentage of all the chips transferred according to Bayes’s rule. It is not the
relative change in the odds. It conflates that change (the Bayes factor) with
the particular prior odds. When the prior odds on H1 are large, more of the
probability chips are on H2, and equally powerful evidence moves fewer
50. Robert E. Kass & Adrian E. Raftery, Bayes Factors, 90 J. Am. Stat. Ass’n 773, 776
(1995); see Peter M. Lee, Bayesian Statistics 140 (4th ed. 2012).
51. The choice of words is not merely a labeling issue. In simple situations, the Bayes
factor and the likelihood ratio are numerically equivalent, but more generally, there are con-
ceptual and operational differences. For instance, simple likelihood ratios can be used to gauge
relative support within any pair of hypotheses, even when the pair is not exhaustive. But when
there are many hypotheses, the Bayes factor is not so simple. See Lee, supra note 50, at 141–42.
It becomes the usual numerator divided by a weighted sum of the likelihoods for each hypoth-
esis. The weights are the probabilities (conditional on the falsity of the hypothesis in the nu-
merator). For an example, see Tacha Hicks et al., A Framework for Interpreting Evidence, in
Forensic DNA Evidence Interpretation 37, 63 (John S. Buckleton et al. eds., 2d ed. 2016).
Furthermore, there is disagreement over the use of a likelihood ratio for highly multidimen-
sional data (such as fingerprint patterns and bullet striations) and whether and how to express
uncertainty with respect to the likelihood ratio itself. Compare Franco Taroni et al., Dismissal
of the Illusion of Uncertainty in the Assessment of a Likelihood Ratio, 15 Law, Probability &
Risk 1, 2 (2016), with M.J. Sjerps et al., Uncertainty and LR: To Integrate or Not to Integrate,
That’s the Question, 15 Law, Probability & Risk 23, 23–26 (2016). My explanation of the
Bayes factor in 1 McCormick, supra note 24, § 185, at 997 n.14, does not mention these
subtleties.
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chips from H2 to H1 than when the prior odds are small. Saks and Spellman
are well aware of this. They continue:
Note that the probative value of a piece of evidence depends on what other
evidence exists in the case. So, for example, when a first witness identifies
the robber-defendant as the bank robber, that evidence has a lot of proba-
tive value. . . . When a second testifies to the same thing, that testimony has
less probative value. And so, too with the next witness who has the same
thing to say. The same testimony from a tenth witness almost certainly
adds nothing to any juror’s belief in the likelihood that the defendant com-
mitted the robbery; thus, it has no probative value even if, had the tenth
witness been the first to testify, his testimony would have been quite proba-
tive. . . . This feature, that additional similar testimony decreases in proba-
tive value, is related to some of the factors on the “negative” side of the
balancing scale regarding trial efficiency . . . . (p. 60)
This is indeed one way to conceive of the probative value of each item of
evidence, but using the probabilities of the hypothesis in question to define
probative value generates some anomalies. Rule 403 calls for balancing pro-
bative value against the trial-efficiency concerns of “undue delay, wasting
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” But if the redundant
“testimony from a tenth witness . . . has no probative value,” how can it even
be relevant and therefore subject to Rule 403 balancing? Certainly, such bal-
ancing occurs in the context of what has gone before, but the drafters spoke
of “probative value” as a separate factor from the “need for the evidence.”52
Their notes suggest that the two factors must be combined and then bal-
anced “against the harm likely to result from . . . admission.”53 The Supreme
Court has described these two factors as necessitating the use of “discounted
probative value,”54 and the McCormick treatise uses the phrase “marginal
probative value.”55 Such phrases seem to presume an “intrinsic probative
52. Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee’s note (“Situations in this area call for balanc-
ing the probative value of and need for the evidence against the harm likely to result from its
admission.”).
53. Id.
54. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182–83 (1997) (“If an alternative were
found to have substantially the same or greater probative value but a lower danger of unfair
prejudice, sound judicial discretion would discount the value of the item first offered and
exclude it if its discounted probative value were substantially outweighed by unfairly prejudi-
cial risk.”).
55. 1 McCormick, supra note 24, § 185, at 1009 n.66, § 206, at 1234; see also Dan M.
Kahan, Essay, The Economics—Conventional, Behavioral, and Political—of “Subsequent Reme-
dial Measures” Evidence, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1616, 1639 (2010). Although I introduced this
phrase into the third edition of McCormick, I now have some qualms about the term. For
cumulative evidence, marginal probative value is the additional weight that E supplies com-
pared to the already-introduced evidence on the same point. If L is conditionally independent
of the other evidence, then E’s probative value is WOE = log-L, and all of this weight is added
to the prior weight. As such, it appears that the marginal probative value can be large even
when the evidence is cumulative. This seems paradoxical, because evidence that is merely
cumulative does not supply much more information to the jury, and log-L is a measure of
information.
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value”56 that does not depend on other, independent items of evidence. That
kind of probative value is more like the purchasing power of money. The
need for additional income may decline as one’s wealth grows, but a dollar is
a dollar, notwithstanding the diminishing marginal utility of additional dol-
lars. Moreover, by making probative value depend on unrelated as well as
related evidence, the marginal probability ÄP can be essentially the same for
probative and nonprobative evidence, making it a peculiar choice as a metric
of probative value.57
The obvious Bayesian measure of probative value is the Bayes factor (B).
In the examples used here, B is equal to the likelihood ratio L, and therefore
the statisticians’ “weight of evidence” is WOE = log-B = log-L.58 The value of
L in these cases tells us just how much more the evidence supports one
theory than another and hence—this is the Bayesian part—just how much
we should adjust our belief (expressed as odds) for any starting point. For
the PSA test for cancer, L = 7 is “the change in odds favoring disease.”59 A
test with greater diagnostic value would have a larger likelihood ratio and
induce a stronger shift toward that conclusion. Linking diagnostic or proba-
tive value to the prior odds makes such comparisons between the diagnostic
values of the different tests difficult, since the value for each changes accord-
ing to other information about the patient. Instead, the likelihood-ratio
measure (or variations on it),60 which keeps prior probabilities out of the
I think the source of this confusion is the meaning of “cumulative.” It could mean evi-
dence that provides a good deal of information, but that jurors do not need it because they
have so much prior information that their minds are already made up. This situation is analo-
gous to the diminishing marginal utility of constant sums of money. Alternatively, “cumula-
tive” could mean evidence that is just redundant—much like having a single witness repeat
himself over and over. The tail end of that kind of cumulative evidence has almost no proba-
tive value, because the nth repetition will probably be the same as the rest, both when H1 is
true and when H2 is true. Therefore, the likelihood ratio associated with the nth repetition is
very close to 1. Formally, Ln = P(En⏐H1, E1, . . . , En-1) / P(E10⏐H2, E1, . . . , En-1) ≈ 1 even if L1 =
P(E1⏐H1) / P(E1⏐H2) is not close to 1, so the terms in the series of likelihood ratios for such
cumulative evidence are not constant (unless the evidentiary items are conditionally indepen-
dent). Consequently, the likelihood-ratio definition of probative value may respond to cumu-
lative evidence without invoking the notion of marginal, instead of total, probative value.
56. Kaye, supra note 40, at 766.
57. When the prior probability is already near 1, neither strong nor weak evidence will
make much of a difference. With the ÄP measure, testimony from saints and sinners alike has
largely the same probative value in this range.
58. The logarithm of B has been called “weight of evidence” since 1878. I.J. Good, A. M.
Turing’s Statistical Work in World War II, 66 Biometrika 393, 393 (1979); accord Lee, supra
note 50, at 127. While working in the town of Banbury to decipher German codes, Alan
Turing famously (in cryptanalysis and statistics, at least) coined the term “ban” to designate a
power of 10 for this metaphorical weight. Good, supra, at 394. Thus, a B of 10 is 1 ban, 100 is 2
ban, and so on.
59. David L. Simel et al., Likelihood Ratios with Confidence: Sample Size Estimation for
Diagnostic Test Studies, 44 J. Clinical Epidemiology 763, 763 (1991).
60. See, e.g., Afina S. Glas et al., The Diagnostic Odds Ratio: A Single Indicator of Test
Performance, 56 J. Clinical Epidemiology 1129 (2003).
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picture, is more typically used to describe the value of test results as evidence
of disease or other conditions in medicine and psychology.61
Using the same measure in law has significant advantages.62 Identifying
probative value with the likelihood ratio (or simple mathematical transfor-
mations of it) clarifies statements that the evidence should be excluded be-
cause the jury will misjudge its probative value and give the evidence more
weight than it “logically” deserves.63 It is a natural and productive way to
interpret the phrase “misleading the jury” in Rule 403.64 The disparity be-
tween the estimate of L for ideal and actual jurors is an “estimation prob-
lem”65 that can militate against admission of evidence. For example, DNA
experts sometimes find it difficult to compute likelihood ratios for complex
DNA mixtures discovered at crime scenes. If the State will not provide a
statistical assessment, an advocate might oppose the admission of evidence
that a defendant’s DNA is such that he is “included” as a possible contribu-
tor on the theory that jurors will think that inclusion is extremely improba-
ble if the defendant is not a contributor—making the denominator of the
likelihood ratio quite small, when, in reality, it could be quite high. Defining
misestimation of weight where weight is given by ÄP is also possible, but this
conception of weight makes such arguments more complex.
In fact, Saks and Spellman themselves revert to either the likelihood-
ratio or Bayes-factor conceptions of probative value when presenting an ex-
ample of circumstantial evidence that raises an estimation problem. They
characterize the evidence as “quite relevant” simply because it has a high
likelihood ratio. The example involves battering as evidence of the identity
of an alleged murderer:66
61. E.g., Jonathan J. Deeks & Douglas G. Altman, Diagnostic Tests 4: Likelihood Ratios,
329 Brit. Med. J. 168 (2004) (“Likelihood ratios [summarize] diagnostic accuracy [and] have
several particularly powerful properties that make them more useful clinically than other sta-
tistics.”); D.H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Misquantification of Probative Value, 27 Law &
Hum. Behav. 645, 649 (2003) (citing authorities).
62. See Kaye & Koehler, supra note 61, at 645–47 (arguing against a related arithmetic-
difference measure used in court by two psychologists). Most legal commentators seem to
agree. See, e.g., Nance, supra note 39, at 70 n. 184, 95–96; Christopher Slobogin, Proving
the Unprovable: The Role of Law, Science, and Speculation in Adjudicating Culpa-
bility and Dangerousness 45 (Am. Psychology-Law Soc’y Series, 2007) (“[T]he ratio is an
eminently sensible way of evaluating the probative value of evidence.”); Kahan, supra note 55;
Lempert, supra note 27. A few authors use the term “relevance ratio” for the likelihood ratio.
See Slobogin, supra, at 45; Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance Ratio:
Evaluating the Probative Value of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 Cornell L.
Rev. 43 (1996).
63. For an example of such phrasing, see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 138
(1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (referring to “certain kinds of hearsay . . . at once so damag-
ing, so suspect, and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such
evidence the minimal weight it logically deserves”).
64. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
65. Lempert, supra note 27, at 1028–29.
66. Pp. 161–62. Conceivably, it is inspired by the improperly framed conditional
probabilities for murder and battering in the 1994 trial of O.J. Simpson. See Steven Strogatz,
The Joy of x: A Guided Tour of Math, from One to Infinity 287–89 (2012).
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For example, if the question is whether a murdered woman was killed by
her husband/boyfriend, is it useful to know that the man physically abused
the woman during their years together? Suppose we know that of every
100,000 battered women, 45 end up being murdered (by anyone) and
99,955 are never murdered. This information would not help you predict
that a battered woman will end up being a murdered woman, since it so
rarely happens. But the question before a jury is different: given that a
woman has been murdered, is it helpful to know that she had been a bat-
tered woman and that her partner was the batterer? Suppose the data show
that of the 45 out of 100,000 battered women who are murdered, 40 are
murdered by their partners and 5 by someone else. Now we know that
battered women who are murdered are eight times more likely to have been
murdered by their partners than by someone else. This clearly is relevant
information by the law’s definition. (p. 161)
“The information provided above,” they write, is “known as a likelihood
ratio” (p. 161), and it creates an estimation problem because the jurors
might “take the evidence of prior battering to suggest that it makes the de-
fendant 800 times as likely to have committed the murder, rather than only
8 times as likely” (p. 162). There is some confusion here, because statements
about how “likely [battered and murdered women are] to have been mur-
dered by their partners” (uxoricide) or “by someone else” (nonuxoricide
murder) are statements about posterior probabilities for uxoricide and
nonuxoricide of the murdered partner.67 A frequency-based likelihood ratio
depends on how much more often battering occurs among cases of uxori-
cide than among the cases of nonuxoricide murder. The key point, however,
is that the problem of probative but misleading evidence can be conceptual-
ized fairly well with the likelihood-ratio or Bayes-factor definition of proba-
tive value. If the ÄP definition is as helpful, Saks and Spellman’s description
of this example does not show it.
This is not to argue against the importance of prior odds for jurors in
reaching decisions and for metacognitive judicial consideration of those
odds in applying Rule 403 (p. 27). Suppose that a man’s PSA test is positive
and that the prevalence of prostate cancer in similar patients is 1 in 11. This
statistic suggests the prior odds are 1 to 10. Bayes’s rule instructs us to mul-
tiply these odds by 7. The high PSA level in this patient has raised the odds
from 1/10 to 7/10. Odds of 7 to 10 are the same as a probability of 7/(10 + 7)
= 0.41. With a 41% probability of cancer, a needle biopsy might well be
advisable. But if the prevalence in similar patients were only 1 in 1001, the
prior odds of 1/1000 would become 7/1000, for a posterior probability of
only 7/1001, or 0.7%. The need for the same action is less clear. But the
67. P. 161. In the symbolism we have been using, the proof of battering by the partner is
E; uxoricide is H1; and non-uxoricide murder is H2. L is P(E⏐H1) / P(E⏐H2) rather than
P(H1⏐E) / P(H2⏐E). The last quantity is the posterior odds on H1. PFEL generally respects this
distinction. The confusion in the wording (or in my reading of the words) speaks to the
difficulty of describing conditional probabilities without using words that transpose (or seem
to transpose) the propositions in conditional probabilities. Pictures, like the one on page 228,
can be clearer.
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difference does not reflect a reduction in the power of the PSA test as a
classifier of men with and without cancer.
Analogously, the probative value of legal evidence—for example, a scru-
pulously conducted DNA test showing an unambiguous match between a
crime-scene sample and a defendant at many loci—is always highly proba-
tive with respect to a theory of the case that includes the hypothesis H1 that
the defendant’s DNA was left at the crime scene. The likelihood ratio might
be 1,000,000. Weighing in at six bans,68 this evidence is quite powerful. But
ÄP does not cleanly separate the power of the evidence to alter a prior belief
from the strength of the prior belief itself. Using ÄP, we would have to say
that the same DNA evidence is not very probative if a security camera video-
tape and multiple fingerprints also placed the defendant at the scene of the
crime. It seems clearer to say that each type of evidence is highly probative—
because each carries considerable weight—but that any one or two of them
would be ample to link the defendant’s DNA to the crime scene. We should
distinguish between sufficiency, which relates to the posterior probability af-
ter all the evidence is weighed (on atomic or holistic bases), and probativity,
which relates to the support that each item of evidence (or a subset of the
evidence) contributes.69 Defining probative value as the Bayes factor cap-
tures the idea of probativity and distinguishes it from sufficiency. The ÄP
definition lacks this analytical clarity and implies that additional evidence
that is very accurate in discriminating between two states of nature is not
probative when it is not necessary.
In short, the Bayesian model of inference that PFEL invokes is one way
to think about relevance, probative value, and the counterweights. But this
possible foundation for Rules 401 and 403 is not the only justification for
the likelihood-ratio conception of the relevance and probative value of cir-
cumstantial evidence. In addition, even within the Bayesian framework, it
may be clearer to define probative value not as the difference in the before-
and-after probabilities for the hypothesis, but as the Bayes factor (or its
logarithm).
Conclusion
Having questioned some of the statements in PFEL about relevance and
probative value, I want to return to PFEL’s broader message that these con-
cepts are amenable to clarification from the perspectives of psychology and
related disciplines. I hope that the second part of this Review has reinforced
this message by further excavating one corner of the foundation. As I stated
at the outset, PFEL is a gem. To the extent I have criticized some small
points, my remarks simply indicate that—like all gems—it can benefit from
gentle polishing. Integrating and applying the variegated body of work in
psychology, logic, philosophy, probability, statistics, and forensic science
that bears on the theoretical and practical facets of the law of evidence is
68. See supra note 58.
69. See Kaye & Koehler, supra note 61, at 647, 655–56.
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almost too much to ask of one or two scholars. Saks and Spellman’s willing-
ness to dig into the psychological assumptions and foundations of evidence
law is a boon to both psychology and law.
